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Abstract
In the comparative interrupted time series design (also called the method of difference-
in-differences), the change in outcome in a group exposed to treatment in the periods before
and after the exposure is compared to the change in outcome in a control group not exposed
to treatment in either period. The standard difference-in-difference estimator for a com-
parative interrupted time series design will be biased for estimating the causal effect of the
treatment if there is an interaction between history in the after period and the groups; for
example, there is a historical event besides the start of the treatment in the after period that
benefits the treated group more than the control group. We present a bracketing method
for bounding the effect of an interaction between history and the groups that arises from a
time-invariant unmeasured confounder having a different effect in the after period than the
before period. The method is applied to a study of the effect of the repeal of Missouri’s
permit-to-purchase handgun law on its firearm homicide rate. We estimate that the effect
of the permit-to-purchase repeal on Missouri’s firearm homicide rate is bracketed between
0.9 and 1.3 homicides per 100,000 people, corresponding to a percentage increase of 17%
to 27% (95% confidence interval: [0.6,1.7] or [11%,35%]). A placebo study provides ad-
ditional support for the hypothesis that the repeal has a causal effect of increasing the rate
of state-wide firearm homicides.
Comparative Interrupted Time Series Design and Potential Bi-
ases
The interrupted time series design is an observational study design for estimating the causal
effect of a treatment on a group when data is available before the group was treated. In the
simplest interrupted time series design, the before and after treatment outcomes are compared.
This before-after design does not account for confounding factors that co-occur with treatment
such as historical events or maturation1. To strengthen the before-after design, it is common to
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add time series data from a control group that never received the treatment over the same period
– the comparative interrupted time series design1,2,3,4, also called the nonequivalent control
group design or method of difference-in-differences. The latter name derives from the concept
that the simplest comparative interrupted time series analysis is to take the difference between
the difference of the after and before outcomes for the treated group and the difference of the
after and before outcomes for the control group. This difference-in-differences estimate is an
unbiased estimator of the causal effect of treatment if the treatment and control groups would
have exhibited parallel trends in the counterfactual absence of treatment2; see Figure 1. The
Figure 1: Stylized plot of data from a comparative interrupted time series design. The dotted
line shows the assumption that the difference-in-difference (DiD) estimate makes about the
treatment group’s counterfactual mean in the absence of treatment.
Before After
Control Group
Treated Group
Counterfactual Treated Group w/o Treatment
DiD Estimate
parallel trends assumption can be partially assessed if there is more than one time point in the
before period by assessing whether the groups exhibit parallel trends in the before period2.
However, even if the trends are parallel in the before period, there could be historical events in
the after period that affect the two groups differently, i.e., history interacts with group (other
reasons that parallel trends could be violated include differences in maturation, instrumentation
or statistical regression between the groups)5,6. For example, the outcome measures poor health,
country A (treated group) enacts a policy reform, country B (control group) does not enact
the reform, and a worldwide economic recession occurs after the reform that has a greater
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impact on people starting out in poorer health. If country B started out with poorer health, then
parallel trends would be violated because country B’s poor health would have increased more
than country A in the after period in the counterfactual absence of the reform because of the
worldwide economic recession. This violation of parallel trends would not happen if A and B
started with the same level of poor health in the before period. However, it is often difficult to
find a control group that has outcomes close to the treated group in the before period.
When there is no control group completely comparable to the treated group, Campbell 7
proposed bracketing to distinguish treatment effects from plausible biases8. For comparing
treatment and control at one time point, suppose there is concern about an unmeasured con-
founder U . Bracketing uses two control groups such that, in the first group U tends to be higher
than in the treated group and in the second group, U tends to be lower. The effect of U on the
treated group is bracketed by its effect on the two control groups. When there is bracketing, if
the treated group has a notably higher outcome than both control groups, then this association
between treatment and outcome cannot plausibly be explained away as being bias from U .
In this paper, we show how bracketing can be applied to the comparative interrupted time se-
ries to distinguish treatment effects from plausible biases due to history interacting with group.
The basic idea is to consider one control group that has a lower expected outcome than the
treated group in the before period and another control group that has a higher expected out-
come than the treated group in the before period; we show under certain assumptions that the
expectations of the two difference-in-difference estimators using the lower control group and
higher control group respectively bracket the causal effect of the treatment. Bracketing for the
comparative interrupted time series has been mentioned informally2 but the idea of choosing
the bracketing control groups based on expected before period outcomes was not mentioned.
We present assumptions and results for our bracketing method (Methods: Bracketing) and then
apply the method to study the effect of the repeal of Missouri’s permit-to-purchase handgun law
on its firearm homicide rate (Application: Effect of the Repeal of Missouri’s Handgun Purchaser
Licensing Law on Firearm Homicides).
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Methods: Bracketing
Notation and Model
Let Y denote outcome and D dose of exposure, D = 1 for treatment and D = 0 for control.
Let Y (d)ip denote the counterfactual outcome that would have been observed for unit i in period
p, p = 0 for before period and p = 1 for after period, had the unit received exposure dose d, i.e.,
Y
(1)
ip is the counterfactual outcome under treatment and Y
(0)
ip is the counterfactual outcome under
control. Let Ui be a vector of time invariant unmeasured confounders for unit i. Let G denote
group where the groups are t = treated group, lc = lower control group (control group with
expected outcomes lower than treated group in before period) and uc = upper control group
(control group with expected outcomes higher than treated group in before period). Finally,
let S be an indicator of whether or not a unit belonging to a particular group is in the study
population in a given period. Specifically, Sip = 1 or 0 when unit i is in the population or
not in period p: Si0 = Si1 = 1 for a unit in the population both before and after treatment,
Si0 = 1, Si1 = 0 for a unit in the population only before treatment (unit might have moved
away or died in after period) and Si0 = 0, Si1 = 1 for a unit in the population only after
treatment (unit might have moved into study area or been born in after period).
We consider the following model which generalizes the standard difference-in-difference
model and changes-in-changes model.9 Let Ui be time-invariant unmeasured confounders and
ip be an error term that captures additional sources of variation for unit i in period p. Then our
model can be expressed as
Y
(d)
ip = h(Ui, p) + βd+ ip (1)
where the function h(Ui, p) is the unobserved expected outcome under control of subject i in
period p. We drop the subscript i to refer to a randomly drawn unit from the population of
all units in either period, where Y (d)p , d = 0, 1, and p are undefined if Sp = 0. We make the
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following assumptions:
Increasingness of h inU: h(U, p) bounded and increasing inU for p = 0, 1. (2)
((h(U, p) ≥ h(U′ , p) whenever all coordinates ofU ≥ all coordinates ofU′)
Time Invariance ofU Within Groups: U conditionally independent of (3)
{S0, S1} given group G.
Independence of  with Time and Group: Distributions of p|Sp = 1, G = g for (4)
p = 0, 1, g = lc, uc, tc all have mean zero and are the same.
Assumptions (2) and (3) match assumptions in the changes-in-changes model. Assumption (2)
requires that higher levels of unmeasured confounders correspond to higher levels of outcomes.
Such increasingness is natural when the unmeasured confounder is an individual characteristic
such as health or ability9 and Y is a measure of some positive outcome, for example, income.
Negative confounders – where higher levels of the confounder correspond to lower levels of the
outcome – are not precluded by Assumption (2) as the corresponding coordinates of U may
simply be replaced by their negation. Assumption (3) says that the distribution of confounders
in the population of units for a given group remains the same over time. Assumption (4) says
that time-varying factors have the same distribution in each group and over time. It would be
sufficient for subsequent developments to just assume the distributions of p|Sp = 1, G = g
for p = 0, 1, g = lc, uc, tc all have mean zero rather than the stronger assumption of identical
distributions. We can further relax this assumption by assuming zero mean only for components
of p that are true confounders, that is, factors whose distributions depend on the interaction of
time and group. Assumption (4) is weaker than the changes-in-changes model assumption
that ip is always zero which rules out classical measurement error in the outcome when h
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is non-linear.9 Our model contains the standard difference-in-difference model, which can be
represented in our model by h(U, p) = k(U) + τp for some bounded and increasing function
k, where k(U) can be viewed as a group fixed effect.
We make two further assumptions about the distribution of U in groups and how its effect
over time changes among the groups. First, we assume the distribution ofU within groups can
be stochastically ordered so that U is lowest in the lower control group, intermediate in the
treated group and highest in the upper control group:
U|G = lc  U|G = t  U|G = uc (5)
where two random vectorsA,B are stochastically ordered,A  B, if E[f(A)] ≤ E[f(B)] for
all bounded increasing functions f 10. For example, if U is normally distributed with common
variance and group means µlc, µt, and µuc, then µlc ≤ µt ≤ µuc would imply (5). Second, we
assume that higher values ofU either have a bigger effect over time over the whole range ofU
or a smaller effect over the whole range:
Either (i) h(U, 1)− h(U, 0) ≥ h(U′ , 1)− h(U′ , 0) for allU ≥ U′ ,U,U′ ∈ U or
(ii) h(U, 1)− h(U, 0) ≤ h(U′ , 1)− h(U′ , 0) for allU ≥ U′ ,U,U′ ∈ U (6)
An example of this pattern of U confounding could occur in a study of the effect of a
regional policy on average income where the policy change occurred contemporaneously with
an easing of trade restrictions. A potential unmeasured confounder for such a study would be
U = share of skilled workers in a region, as a higher share of skilled workers is associated
with higher average income. There is considerable evidence that trade liberalization leads to an
increase in the skill premium – the relative wage of skilled to unskilled workers – at both the
regional and country level11,12. Thus, we might expect (i) in (6) to hold if there was an easing
of trade restrictions in the after period.
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We assume units are randomly sampled from each group in each time period. The data could
be obtained from repeated cross sections or a longitudinal study. Inferences under different
sampling assumptions are discussed in Appendix 1.
Bracketing Result
The standard moment difference-in-difference estimator using control condition c can be written
as βˆdd.c = (Y 1|G=t − Y 0|G=t)− (Y 1|G=c − Y 0|G=c) where Y p|G=g indicates the sample average
of units observed in group g and time period p, Yp|G = g, Sp = 1. This estimate is equivalent
to the coefficient on the treatment indicator in a fixed effects regression with full time and
group indicator variables. When using data already aggregated at some level, for example by
state-year, a fixed effects regression using weights proportional to population will return this
estimate. In the following, we show that the expectation of the two standard difference-in-
difference estimators computed with the upper and lower controls can be used to bound the
treatment effect.
The expected value of the standard difference-in-difference estimator comparing the treated
group to the lower control group, βˆdd.lc, is
E[βˆdd.lc] = {E[Y1|G = t, S1 = 1]− E[Y0|G = t, S0 = 1]}
−{E[Y1|G = lc, S1 = 1]− E[Y0|G = lc, S0 = 1]}
= {β + E[h(U, 1)|G = t, S1 = 1]− E[h(U, 0)|G = t, S0 = 1]}
−{E[h(U, 1)|G = lc, S1 = 1]− E[h(U, 0)|G = lc, S0 = 1]},
where Y1, Y0 denote observed outcomes in after period (p = 1) and before period (p = 0)
respectively. Under the time invariance ofU within groups assumption (3), we have
E[βˆdd.lc] = β + {E[h(U, 1)− h(U, 0)|G = t]} − {E[h(U, 1)− h(U, 0)|G = lc]}; (7)
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similarly, the expected value of the difference-in-difference estimator comparing the treated
group to the upper control group, βˆdd.uc, is
E[βˆdd.uc] = β + {E[h(U, 1)− h(U, 0)|G = t]} − {E[h(U, 1)− h(U, 0)|G = uc]}. (8)
The difference-in-difference estimators βˆdd.lc and βˆdd.uc are unbiased if h(U, 1) − h(U, 0) is
constant for all U, i.e., the time effect between periods is the same for all levels of U, or
equivalently, the effect of the unmeasured confounders is the same in both time periods. If the
effect of the unmeasured confounders changes between periods, then because of assumptions
(5) and (6), we conclude from (7) and (8) that
min{E[βˆdd.lc], E[βˆdd.uc]} ≤ β ≤ max{E[βˆdd.lc], E[βˆdd.uc]}, (9)
i.e., the expected values of the difference-in-difference estimators using the upper control group
and lower control group bracket the causal effect (proof in Appendix 2). The tightness of the
bracketing bounds in (9) and, to some extent, the width of the corresponding confidence interval
developed in following section depend on the magnitude of the group-by-time interaction. For
example, if urban poverty concentration varied notably between groups and its effect on firearm
homicides were modulated by the Great Recession, one would expect looser bracketing bounds.
Inference
We would like to make inferences for the causal effect β under the assumption (6) that h(U, 1)−
h(U, 0) is either an increasing or decreasing function of U (we do not want to specify which a
priori). Let θlc.t = E[βˆdd.lc] and θuc.t = E[βˆdd.uc], i.e., the expected values of the difference-in-
difference estimators using the lower control group and upper control group, respectively. From
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the bracketing results (9), we have
min(θlc.t, θuc.t) ≤ β ≤ max(θlc.t, θuc.t).
and the following interval, where CI means confidence interval,
[min(lower endpoint of 1− α two sided CI for θlc.t, lower endpoint of 1− α two sided CI for θuc.t),
max(upper endpoint of 1− α two sided CI for θlc.t, upper endpoint of 1− α two sided CI for θuc.t)],
(10)
has probability ≥ 1 − α of containing both min(θlc.t, θuc.t) and max(θlc.t, θuc.t), and thus β,
where it assumed that the two-sided CIs are constructed by taking the intersection of two one-
sided 1− (α/2) confidence intervals (proof in Appendix 3).
Constructing the Lower and Upper Control Groups
The results in Bracketing Result and Inference assume the lower and upper control groups have
been constructed before looking at the data. If the lower control group was constructed by
looking at the before period data by choosing units with lower outcomes than the treated in
the before period, then the sample average of Y0|G = lc, S0 = 1 may tend to be lower than
E(Y0|G = lc, S0 = 1). Consequently, the difference-in-difference estimate using the lower
control group may be downward biased even if the parallel trends assumption holds because
of regression to the mean1; similarly, the difference-in-difference estimated using the upper
control group may be upward biased. This may invalidate the bracketing result (9). To avoid
bias arising from regression to the mean, we propose first selecting a “pre-study” time period
prior to the before period. Then, the lower control group can be constructed from units with
lower outcomes than the treated in this pre-study period and the upper control group from units
with higher outcomes. It should then be tested whether the constructed lower control group has
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smaller expected outcomes than the constructed upper control group in the before period; see
Application: Effect of the Repeal of Missouri’s Handgun Purchaser Licensing Law on Firearm
Homicides for example.
Role of Examining the Groups’ Relative Trends in the Before Period
In the standard difference-in-difference analysis that assumes parallel trends, when the before
period contains multiple time points, it is good practice to test for parallel trends in the before
period2,13. In our bracketing approach, we do not need the parallel trend assumption to hold,
but examining the relative trends of the groups in the before period is still useful for assessing
model plausibility and assumptions. Our model (1)-(4) along with assumptions (5)-(6) implies
that if we had counterfactual data on the treatment group in the after period in the absence of
treatment, then, without sampling variance, we would see either: (i) the differences between the
upper control and counterfactual treated groups and the difference between the counterfactual
treated and lower control groups in the after period would be at least as large as their respective
differences in the before period or (ii) the difference between the upper control and counter-
factual treated groups and the difference between the counterfactual treated and lower control
groups in the after period would be no larger and possibly smaller than their respective differ-
ences in the before period. The following two patterns would violate the model/assumptions:
(iii) the difference between the upper control and counterfactual treated groups is larger after
than before and the difference between the counterfactual treated and lower control groups is
smaller after than before or (iv) the difference between the upper control and counterfactual
treated groups is smaller after than before and the difference between the counterfactual treated
and lower control groups is larger after than before. Although we do not have the counterfac-
tual treatment group’s data in the absence of treatment in the after period, we have the treatment
group’s data in the absence of treatment in the before period. We can split the before period
into two (or more) periods and test whether the pattern in the before period is consistent with
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the model. Visual inspection of the relative trends of the counterfactual treated group and the
upper and lower control groups during the before period can provide additional evidence for or
against the model assumptions.
Time-Varying Confounders
Our bracketing method addresses an interaction between history and groups that arises because
the time-invariant unmeasured confounders that differ between the groups in the before period
(U) become more (or less) important in the after period (assumption (6)). When there are
time-varying confounders, the bracketing method still works under certain assumptions. Time-
varying confounders can be represented in model (1) by letting U contain all variables that
differ in distribution between the groups in the before period, i0 be the effect of factors that do
not differ in distribution between the groups in the before period and i1 be the effect of the same
factors in i0 in the after period as well as factors not contained in U that differ in distribution
between the groups in the after period (details on time-varying model in Appendix 4). If this
last set of factors is present, then (4) may not hold. However, the bracketing result (9) still holds
as long as (i) in (6) holds,
E[i1|G = uc] ≥ E[i1|G = t] ≥ E[i1|G = lc], (11)
or when (ii) in (6) holds,
E[i1|G = uc] ≤ E[i1|G = t] ≤ E[i1|G = lc]; (12)
Appendix 4 contains a proof and sufficient conditions for (11) or (12) to hold. One of these
sufficient conditions (condition (c) in Appendix 4) is analogous to (i) in (6) in that effects on
the outcome, be they time effects or those due to contemporaneous shocks to confounders, are
amplified at larger values ofU.
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One type of time-varying confounder is a variable that largely stays the same between time
periods but may change modestly. For example, in our study of Missouri’s repeal of their
permit-to-purchase law in Application: Effect of the Repeal of Missouri’s Handgun Purchaser
Licensing Law on Firearm Homicides, urban concentration of poverty might be a confounder
and U contain urban concentration of poverty in the before period. Urban concentration of
poverty may stay mostly the same over time but change modestly, where the changes are re-
flected in 1. If the effect of urban concentration of poverty on firearm homicides increased
in the after period, then the bracketing result would still hold (with respect to the confounding
from urban concentration of poverty) as long as the impact of changes in urban concentration
of poverty on firearm homicides were at least as great in the upper control group as Missouri
and at least as great in Missouri as the lower control group.
Application: Effect of the Repeal of Missouri’s Handgun Pur-
chaser Licensing Law on Firearm Homicides
American federal gun law requires background checks and record keeping for gun sales by fed-
erally licensed firearm dealers but exempts these regulations for private sales. However, some
states have laws requiring all purchasers of handguns from licensed dealers and private sellers to
acquire a permit-to-purchase license that verifies the purchaser has passed a background check.
Missouri passed a permit-to-purchase law in 1921, requiring handgun purchasers to obtain a
license from the local sheriff’s office that facilitated the background check, but repealed the
law on August 28, 2007. Webster et al. 14 examined the effect of Missouri’s repeal on firearm
homicide rates (the rate of homicides committed using a firearm). One of their analyses used
a comparative interrupted time series design, comparing Missouri to the eight states bordering
Missouri using a before-period of 1999-2007 and after-period of 2008-2010 (the only available
post-repeal data at the time of their analysis), finding evidence that the repeal of Missouri’s
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permit-to-purchase law increased firearm homicide rates (see their Table 1). None of the border
states introduced new or made changes to existing permit-to-purchase laws during the study pe-
riod. Using a fixed effect regression and adjusting for several background crime and economic
covariates, they estimated that the Missouri permit-to-purchase repeal was associated with an
increase in the firearm homicide rate by 1.1 per 100,000 persons (95% confidence interval [CI]:
0.8,1.4) , a 22% (95% CI: 16 %, 29%) increase. Non-gun related homicides remained virtually
unchanged. In what follows, we re-examine the effect of Missouri’s repeal using bracketing
and the now available after-period data from 2008-2016 to address possible biases arising from
unobserved state-by-time interactions.
Figure 2 shows the age-adjusted firearm homicide rates in Missouri and the border states
over the study period using data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC)
Wide-ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research (WONDER) system15. The standard
difference-in-difference estimate using all neighboring control states, shown in the top row of
Table 2, is that Missouri’s permit-to-purchase repeal increased firearm homicides by 1.2 per
100,000 persons (95% CI: 1.0,1.4), corresponding to a 24% increase (95% CI: 18%,31%). In
Figure 2: Age-adjusted firearm homicide rates in Missouri and states bordering Missouri
(population-weighted averages), 1999-2016.
the before-period, Missouri had generally higher firearm homicide rates than the control border
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states, suggesting a lack of comparability between the groups. One concern is that the start of
the after period coincided with the beginning of the Great Recession. The economic downturn
was followed by a decline in homicide rates. Possible reasons for the effect of the downturn
on homicide rates and violence generally include changing alcohol affordability, disposable
income, unemployment, and income inequality16,17,18. The effects of the economic downturn
on firearm homicides might interact with the starting level of firearm homicides in a state. To
address this concern, we constructed upper and lower control groups that bracket Missouri’s
firearm homicide rate in the before period. To avoid regression to the mean (Constructing the
Lower and Upper Control Groups), we use data from 1994-1998, the five years prior to our
before period, to choose the upper and lower control groups; see Table 1 for data. The lower
control group is Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, and Oklahoma and the upper control group
is Arkansas, Illinois, and Tennessee. The population-weighted firearm homicide rate in the
before period of 1999-2007 is 5.2 in the upper control states, 4.7 in Missouri, and 2.7 in the
lower control states (95% CI for difference between upper control and Missouri: 0.2,0.8; 95%
CI for difference between Missouri and lower controls: 1.8,2.2).
Figure 3 shows firearm homicides rates (age-adjusted and population-weighted) in the brack-
eted control groups compared to Missouri. The bottom two rows of Table 2 show the difference-
in-difference estimates using the lower and upper control groups and 95% CIs. Both the lower
and upper control groups provide evidence that Missouri’s repeal of its permit-to-purchase
handgun law increased firearm homicides, bracketing the effect of the repeal between 0.9 and
1.3 homicides per 100,000 people, corresponding to a percentage increase of 17% to 27%. The
interval (10) that has a≥ 95% chance of containing the effect of the repeal on the firearm homi-
cide rate is [0.6, 1.7], corresponding to an 11% to 35% increase in firearm homicides, providing
evidence that the repeal increased firearm homicides.
15
Table 1: Age-adjusted firearm homicide rates per 100,000 persons from periods 1994-1998
(pre-study period used to construct lower and upper control groups), 1999-2007 (before repeal
period where repeal refers to repeal of Missouri’s permit-to-purchase handgun licensing law)
and 2008-2016 (after repeal period).
1994-1998 1999-2007 2008-2016
Missouri 6.1 4.7 6.1
Arkansas 7.3 5.1 5.5
Illinois 7.1 5.1 5.2
Iowa 1.2 0.9 1.2
Kansas 4.2 3.0 3.0
Kentucky 4.1 3.3 3.7
Nebraska 2.2 1.8 2.4
Oklahoma 4.8 3.8 4.8
Tennessee 6.9 5.5 5.4
Population-weighted 5.6 4.2 4.4
All Controls
Population-weighted 7.1 5.2 5.3
Upper Controls
Population-weighted 3.5 2.7 3.2
Lower Controls
Figure 3: Age-adjusted gun homicide rates per 100,000 persons in Missouri, lower control
states bordering Missouri (population-weighted averages) and upper control states bordering
Missouri, 1999-2016.
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Table 2: Difference-in-difference estimates of effect of repeal of Missouri’s permit-to-purchase
handgun licensing requirement on firearm homicide rates per 100,000 persons. CI indicates
confidence interval.
Control Group Estimate 95% CI Corresponding % Change Estimate 95% CI
All Controls 1.2 [0.9, 1.5] 24% [18% ,31%]
Upper Controls 1.3 [0.9, 1.7] 27% [19% ,35%]
Lower Controls 0.9 [0.6, 1.2] 17% [11% ,23%]
Assessing Model Assumptions: Time-Varying Confounders and Relative
Trends
A type of time-varying confounder that is relevant to the Missouri permit-to-purchase study
is a factor that only arises in the after period. The Ferguson unrest in 2014 might have led to
less effective policing (spikes in violence typically follow social unrest) in Missouri compared
to other states. Such a time-varying confounder would be unlikely to satisfy (11) or (12) because
it arises only in the treated group (Missouri) in the after period. However, this confounder alone
does not change our finding that the repeal increased firearm homicides. If we limit the study
to 2008-2013, Missouri still has larger increases in firearm homicide rates than both the upper
and lower control groups; see Appendix 6.
To assess the plausibility of our model (1)-(4) and assumptions (5)-(6), we apply the relative
trends test described in Role of Examining the Groups’ Relative Trends in the Before Period.
Applying the test to our study of the repeal of Missouri’s permit-to-purchase law, we do not
find evidence that our model assumptions are violated. Visual inspection of the relative trends
of counterfactual Missouri and the upper and lower controls in the before period further supports
the plausibility of our model assumptions; see eFigure 1 in Appendix 5.
Standard Error Estimates: A Poisson Model for Death Counts
The standard errors used for inference in the previous section come directly from the CDC
WONDER system. Vital statistics that derive from complete counts of deaths (by cause) are not
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subject to sampling error. Nonetheless, a stochastic model of vital statistics may be justified by
the presence of biological, environmental, sociological, and other natural sources of variabil-
ity19. For inferential purposes, a census may be viewed as a realization from such a stochastic
process under similar conditions to those observed20. In particular, the observed firearm homi-
cide death rate in any state-year may be viewed as one of a large series of possible Poisson
distributed outcomes under similar conditions21. The standard errors reported by the CDC are
computed under this Poisson model.
A Placebo Study: Assessing Alternative Sources of Uncertainty
There may be other sources of uncertainty unaccounted for by the natural variability of a Poisson
model for yearly state-level firearm homicides. Several recent papers suggest that such sources
of uncertainty, if ignored, may yield substantially different inferential conclusions. Serially
correlated data22, yearly state-level shocks23, and small numbers of policy changes24 can cause
the standard errors returned by a fixed effects regression to be downwardly biased. We conduct
a placebo study25,22 to address inferential challenges that arise from the presence of possibly
dependent, yearly state-level shocks to the conditions that generate these Poisson realizations.
Akin to permutation inference, a placebo study in the context of the Missouri permit-to-
purchase repeal analysis applies the bracketing method to every state to create a placebo inter-
vention effect distribution. Specifically, for each state where there was no permit-to-purchase
repeal we construct lower and upper control groups of neighboring states, when available, in
exactly the same way we did so for Missouri. We then compute the difference-in-difference
estimates using both control groups for a placebo “repeal” on August 28, 2007. This results in
two exact distributions for the placebo intervention effect estimate, one estimated using lower
controls and the other using upper controls. If the permit-to-purchase repeal effect in Missouri
is not spurious, we would expect to see few placebo effects greater than the ones reported in our
study using either control condition. The histograms of the placebo effects in Figure 4 suggest
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Figure 4: Histograms of placebo “repeal” effects using different control states. (Left Panel):
Histogram of placebo difference-in-difference estimates using lower control states (n = 38
states with lower control neighbors – includes Missouri). Two states (Oklahoma and Delaware)
had a larger estimate than Missouri (dashed line).(Right Panel): Histogram of placebo
difference-in-difference estimates using upper control states (n = 37 states with upper con-
trol neighbors – includes Missouri). One state (Delaware) had a larger estimate than Missouri
(dashed line).
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that the Missouri bracketing study is relatively robust to these alternative sources of variabil-
ity. Of the 38 states that had lower control neighbors, only two (Oklahoma and Delaware) had
placebo effect estimates using lower controls that were larger than Missouri (dashed line, left
panel). Of the 37 states that had upper control neighbors, only one (Delaware) had a placebo
effect estimate using upper controls that was larger than Missouri (dashed line, right panel).
Alaska, Hawaii, the District of Columbia and three states with missing data in either the pre-
study, before or after period were excluded from the analysis.
Conclusion and Discussion
We developed a bracketing method for comparative interrupted time series to account for con-
cerns that history may interact with groups. In a study of the repeal of Missouri’s permit-to-
purchase handgun law, the method addressed a concern that on average, control states started
out with lower firearm homicide rates than Missouri before the repeal. Comparing both to states
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that started with higher firearm homicide rates than Missouri and states that started with lower
rates, the repeal was associated with a significant increase in firearm homicides, thus strength-
ening the evidence that the repeal had a causal effect of increasing firearm homicides.
A limitation of our estimated impact of the repeal of Missouri’s permit-to-purchase law is
that a Stand Your Ground law was simultaneously adopted in Missouri. However, in the original
study by Webster et al. 14 , the inclusion of a Stand Your Ground indicator in the regression did
not dramatically change the estimated effect. Additionally, a recent comparative interrupted
time series study examining firearm homicide rates in large urban counties found that permit-to-
purchase laws were associated with significant reductions in firearm homicides after controlling
for the effects of Stand Your Ground laws26. Further evidence that the contemporaneous Stand
Your Ground law does not change the qualitative conclusion of our study can be found in the
placebo study. There were 16 additional states that adopted Stand Your Ground laws within
a few years of Missouri’s permit-to-purchase repeal26. Only one state (Oklahoma) of the 16
had a difference-in-difference placebo effect estimate using lower controls that was larger than
Missouri and none of the states had placebo effect estimates using upper controls that were
larger than Missouri.
Although only one of many potential patterns of bias, the history-by-group interaction bias
addressed in this paper has been mentioned in the literature since at least the middle of the 20th
century. A version of it is referred to selection-maturation interaction in a taxonomy of possible
threats to the validity of experimental and quasi-experimental designs presented in Campbell
and Stanley27. Fundamentally, bracketing relies on constructing control groups across which
this potential source of confounding is systematically varied28. Other methods for constructing
adequate control groups in the presence of history-by-group interactions, such as the synthetic
control method25, have also found success in comparative case studies of the effect of permit-to-
purchase laws on firearm homicide rates29. While we do not argue that bracketing is uniformly
superior to the synthetic control method, the practitioner may find that each has strengths that
lend themselves to different settings. When the researcher believes that unmeasured history-by-
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group confounding, h(U, p), can be expressed as a linear factor model with time-varying slopes
and group-specific loadings, the synthetic control method provides an asymptotically unbiased
point estimate of the causal effect of treatment while bracketing can only provide bounds on the
treatment effect. However, when the practitioner suspects that only the weaker assumptions of
the model outlined in Notation and Model hold, the bracketing bounds will remain unbiased, in
that they contain the true effect in expectation, while the point estimate using synthetic controls
need not be unbiased; see Appendix 7 for further discussion. A detailed example of such a case
can be found in the Appendix 8.
Appendix
Appendix 1: Inferences Under Different Sampling Assumptions
The standard difference-in-difference estimator using a control group c, βˆdd.c, is
βˆdd.c = {Eˆ[Y1|G = t, S1 = 1]− Eˆ[Y0|G = t, S0 = 1]}
−{Eˆ[Y1|G = c, S1 = 1]− Eˆ[Y0|G = c, S0 = 1]}.
When the samples of (i) Y1|G = t, S1 = 1, (ii) Y0|G = t, S0 = 1, (iii) Y1|G = c, S1 = 1 and
(iv) Y0|G = c, S0 = 1 are independent, then the standard error of βˆdd.c is
SE(βˆdd.c) =
{SE(Eˆ[Y1|G = t, S1 = 1])2 + SE(Eˆ[Y0|G = t, S0 = 1])2
+SE(Eˆ[Y1|G = c, S1 = 1])2 + SE(Eˆ[Y0|G = c, S0 = 1])2}1/2. (13)
We use (13) to make inferences for our study of the effect of the repeal of Missouri’s permit-
to-purchase law, where the Eˆ and corresponding SEs are obtained from the CDC’s WONDER
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system.
Let κtt be the % change in the treated group’s mean outcome in the after period compared
to its mean counterfactual outcomes in the after period in the absence of treatment,
κtt = 100× E[Y
(1)
1 |G = t, S1 = 1]− E[Y (0)1 |G = t, S1 = 1]
E[Y
(0)
1 |G = t, S1 = 1]
.
An estimate of κtt using control group c and assuming the parallel trends of standard-in-
differences is
κˆtt.c = 100× βˆdd.c
Eˆ(Y0|G = t, S0 = 1) + {Eˆ(Y1|G = c, S1 = 1)− Eˆ(Y0|G = c, S0 = 1)}
.
We approximate the standard error of κˆtt.c using the Delta method.
The model (1) can be extended to allow for observed covariates, clustering and multiple time
points using a regression framework30. The difference-in-difference estimator may be computed
by regressing the observed outcome Y on a time period dummy, a group dummy and a treatment
variable. Observed covariates Xip that could vary by time can be incorporated into the model
and then the difference-in-difference regression estimator can be computed by regressing Y
on the observed covariates, a time period dummy, a group dummy and a treatment variable.
The model assumptions then need to hold only conditionally on the observed covariates. The
comparative interrupted time series can be applied to settings with more than two time periods.
A full set of time period dummies can be added to model (1). The effect of the treatment over
time can be allowed to vary by interacting the treatment dummy with time.
Within each group, there may be clusters of units, e.g., different countries that had the same
policy reform. For such settings, we can extend model (1) to the following23 where the index
cip denotes the ith unit in cluster c at time period p:
Y
(d)
cip = h(Ucip, p) + βd+ ηcp + cip, (14)
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where ηcp represents an effect shared by members of cluster c in period p, e.g., an economic
shock that is specific to a country c in period p. Under an assumption that the ηcp are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) normal random variables, Donald and Lang 23 showed that
if we compute the mean in each cluster at each time period, and regress these cluster/period
means on fixed effects for each cluster, a time period dummy and a treatment variable, then
the t statistic for the treatment variable ( βˆ−β
SE(βˆ)
) has a t distribution with the number of clusters
minus two degrees of freedom. Using this approach, we do not need to have individual data but
only summary data for each cluster. Other approaches to inference that allow for the ηcp to be
non-i.i.d. such as autocorrelated within group, have been developed.22,31.
Note that the presence of at least two clusters in at least one group enables us to make
inferences that allow for shared effects ηcp. When there is only one cluster in each group, e.g.,
we are comparing just two countries, one in which a policy reform was implemented and one in
which it was not, then there are zero degrees of freedom to estimate the variance of the ηcp so
inferences cannot be drawn that allow for ηcp to be nonzero using data from entirely within the
sample. For such settings, it may be possible to get information from outside the sample to get
a plausible estimate of the variance of the ηcp 32,23.
Appendix 2: Proof of (9) in Bracketing Result
Suppose h(U, 1) − h(U, 0) is a bounded increasing function of U. Then from (5) and the
property that bounded increasing functions of stochastically ordered random variables preserve
order, it follows that
E[βˆdd.uc] ≤ β ≤ E[βˆdd.lc]. (15)
Similarly, if h(U, 1)− h(U, 0) is a bounded decreasing function ofU,
E[βˆdd.lc] ≤ β ≤ E[βˆdd.uc]. (16)
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(9) follows from (15) and (16).
Appendix 3: Proof for Result in Inference
Here we prove that (10) has probability≥ 1−α of containing bothmin(θlc.t, θuc.t) andmax(θlc.t, θuc.t)
under the assumption that the two sided CIs are constructed in the usual way by taking the union
of two one-sided 1 − (α/2) confidence intervals. The result is basically derived by inverting
multiparameter hypothesis tests about the minimum or maximum of two parameters33,34. Let
q = min(θlc.t, θuc.t) and r = max(θlc.t, θuc.t). The probability that (10) does not contain both
min(θlc.t, θuc.t) and max(θlc.t, θuc.t) is bounded by the probability that q is less than the lower
endpoint of the interval plus the probability that r is greater than the upper endpoint of the inter-
val. The probability that q is less than the lower endpoint of the interval is the probability that
both one-sided tests H l0 : θlc.t ≤ q vs. H l1 : θlc.t > q and Hu0 : θuc.t ≤ q vs. H l1 : θuc.t > q give
p-values ≤ α/2, which has probability at most α/2 since each individual event has probability
at most α/2. Similarly, the probability that r is greater than the upper endpoint of the interval
is the probability that both one-sided tests H l′0 : θlc.t ≥ r vs. H l′1 : θlc.t < r and Hu′0 : θuc.t ≥ r
vs. H l′1 : θuc.t < r give p-values ≤ α/2, which has probability at most α/2 since each indi-
vidual event has probability at most α/2. Thus, the probability that (10) does not contain both
min(θlc.t, θuc.t) and max(θlc.t, θuc.t) is bounded by α.
Appendix 4: Modeling Time-varying Confounders
We model a setting with time-varying confounders as follows. We maintain the assumptions
in Section Notation and Model except for (4). We let U contain all variables that affect the
outcome that differ in distribution between the groups (treated, upper control, lower control)
in the before period and let 0 summarize the effect of factors in the before period that do not
differ in distribution between the groups. We can model the average effect of the factors in 0
as an intercept in the h(U, 0) function so that E(0|S0 = 1, G = g) = 0 holds for all groups
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g = lc, uc, tc. The effect of factors that do not differ in distribution between the groups in the
after period as well as the effect of time-varying confounders in the after period are summarized
in 1. Some of these time-varying confounders may be variables in U that have changed their
level over time. Let U0 ≡ U be the value of the variables in U in the before period and U1
be their value in the after period, where U0 = U1 for a unit only in the population in the after
period (with U defined this way, the validity of (3) needs to be considered carefully). Then,
assuming that the average effect of the factors in 1 that do not differ between the groups in the
after period is modeled as an intercept in h(U, 1), we have
E(1|G = g, S1 = 1) = E[h(U1, 1)− h(U0, 1)|G = g, S1 = 1].
Then for (11) to hold, we need to have
E[h(U1, 1)− h(U0, 1)|G = uc, S1 = 1] ≥ E[h(U1, 1)− h(U0, 1)|G = t, S1 = 1]
≥ E[h(U1, 1)− h(U0, 1)|G = lc, S1 = 1] (17)
A set of sufficient conditions for (17) to hold when U is univariate and the assumptions in
Section Notation and Model hold is the following: (a) S0 = S1 = 1 for all units so that all units
are in the study population in both periods; (b) U1 − U0 is independent of U0 given G; (c) the
function h(U, 1) is convex in U so that h has increasing differences in the sense that for u, u′ , u′′ ,
u
′′′ such that u−u′ = u′′−u′′′ and u > u′′ , the following inequality holds: h(u, 1)−h(u′ , 1) ≥
h(u
′′
, 1)− h(u′′′ , 1), and (d) U1 − U0|G = lc  U1 − U0|G = t  U1 − U0|G = uc. The proof
that this set of sufficient conditions implies that (17) holds is as follows. Let Dlc be a random
variable with the distribution of U1−U0|G = lc where Dlc is independent of U0 given G. Then
from (c) and (5), it follows that
E[h(U0 +Dlc, 1)− h(U0, 1)|G = t] ≥ E[h(U0 +Dlc, 1)− h(U0, 1)|G = lc]. (18)
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Now let Dt be a random variable with the conditional distribution of U1−U0|G = t and Duc be
a random variable with the conditional distribution of U1 − U0|G = uc where Dt and Duc are
independent of U0 given G. Then from (d) and h being an increasing function, it follows that
E[h(U0 +Dt)|G = t] ≥ E[h(U0 +Dlc)|G = t]. Combining this with (18), we have
E[h(U0 +Dt, 1)− h(U0, 1)|G = t] ≥ E[h(U0 +Dlc, 1)− h(U0, 1)|G = lc]
which is equivalent to
E[h(U1, 1)− h(U0, 1)|G = t] ≥ E[h(U1, 1)− h(U0, 1)|G = lc]. (19)
Similarly from (d) and h being an increasing function, it follows thatE[h(U0+Duc)|G = uc] ≥
E[h(U0 +Dt)|G = uc], and from (c) and (5), it follows that
E[h(U0 +Dt, 1)− h(U0, 1)|G = uc] ≥ E[h(U0 +Dt, 1)− h(U0, 1)|G = t],
and combining these, we have that
E[h(U0 +Duc, 1)− h(U0, 1)|G = uc] ≥ E[h(U0 +Dt, 1)− h(U0, 1)|G = t]
which is equivalent to
E[h(U1, 1)− h(U0, 1)|G = uc] ≥ E[h(U1, 1)− h(U0, 1)|G = t]. (20)
Combining (19) and (20) gives us the desired conclusion.
Proof that (9) still holds as long as when (i) in (6) holds, (11) holds or when (ii) in (6) holds,
(12) holds. When there are time varying confounders, we have that E[βˆdd.lc] is the expression
on the right hand side of (7) plus E(1|G = t, S1 = 1)− E(1|G = lc, S0 = 1) and E[βˆdd.lc] is
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the expression on the right hand side of (8) plus E(1|G = t, S1 = 1)−E(1|G = uc, S0 = 1).
When (i) in (6) holds, the expression on the right hand side of (7) is ≥ β and the expression
on the right hand side of (8) is ≤ β. Combining the facts in the last two sentences, we have
that if (i) in (6) and (11) holds, E[βˆdd.uc] ≤ β ≤ E[βˆdd.lc] and if (ii) in (6) and (12) holds,
E[βˆdd.lc] ≤ β ≤ E[βˆdd.uc].
Appendix 5: Test of Model/Assumptions by Examining the Groups’ Rela-
tive Trends in the Before Period
We can test whether the violating pattern (iii) is present in the before period using an intersection-
union test33,34, which find evidence (say p-value < 0.05) for (iii) if there is evidence (p-value
< .05) for both (a) the difference between the upper control group and the counterfactual treated
group is larger in the second part of the before period than the first part and (b) the difference
between the counterfactual treated group and the lower control group is smaller in the second
part than the first part; for the firearm homicide data, splitting the before period into the two
parts, 1999-2002 and 2003-2007, (a) gives a p-value of 0.96 and (b) gives a p-value of 0.5, so
there is not evidence for (iii) being violated. Pattern (iv) can be tested in a similar way and
for the firearm homicide data, there is not evidence for pattern (iv) holding (p-values of 0.04
and 0.5). Ideally, this testing procedure should have sufficient power to reduce the chance of
proceeding with the analysis when the assumptions of the model don’t, in fact, hold to an ac-
ceptable level. When sample sizes are beyond the control of the investigator or, for example,
when dealing with complete counts of firearm homicides where variability depends on the rate
itself rather than sampling error, increasing the level of the test can achieve some improvement
in power. The p-value is≥ 0.5 for the test of each alternative, that (iii) holds and that (iv) holds.
Hence, α would have to be increased beyond 0.5 to affect the conclusions about the plausibility
of our model assumptions.
Alternatively, the presence of violating patterns (iii) and (iv) can be assessed visually with-
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out requiring a formal testing procedure. In the left panel of eFigure 1 we plot the relative
trends of the population-weighted firearm homicide rates for the upper (dashed blue) and lower
(dashed red) groups and the counterfactual treated group (dashed black) over the before period.
The vertical bars indicate 95% CIs. Visually, there is no strong evidence that pattern (iii) or
(iv) is present. The difference between upper controls and counterfactual Missouri and between
counterfactual Missouri and the lower controls both get smaller in the latter part of the before
period. We can also partially assess whether this pattern might hold over the entire study period,
our primary concern, by addressing how the upper and lower control trends compare between
the before period and the entire study period. In the right panel of eFigure 1 we plot the relative
trends of the two control groups and treated group over the entire study period. The dashed black
lines are not comparable between panels because the left panel is a counterfactual trend whereas
the trend in the right panel is subject to treatment (i.e. permit-to-purchase repeal). However, we
can assess the comparability of the pattern of the control group trends between the two panels.
They appear similar, with a slight narrowing of the difference in population-weighted firearm
homicide rates over time.
Figure 5: (Left Panel): Relative trends of the population-weighted firearm homicide rates for
the upper (dashed blue) and lower (dashed red) groups and the counterfactual treated group
(dashed black) over the before period. The vertical bars indicate 95% CIs. (Right Panel):
Relative trends of the population-weighted firearm homicide rates for the upper (dashed blue)
and lower (dashed red) groups and the treated group (dashed black) over the entire period. The
vertical bars indicate 95% CIs.
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When paired with the test described above, visual inspection can answer questions about our
model assumptions that our intersection-union tests do not address directly: If we find evidence
that pattern (iii) or (iv) is present, are the violations substantial enough to arrest the planned
analysis or should we still proceed but with increased caution? If the test doesn’t find evidence
of a violation is that because our assumptions hold, at least approximately, or is it due to large
standard errors and/or low power? We recommend that testing and visual inspection should be
used in conjunction when assessing the plausibility of the model assumptions.
If one does find evidence for pattern (iii) or (iv) holding in the before period, and if one
thinks there has been a structural shift such that the model (1)-(4) and assumptions (5)-(6) only
start to hold in the latter part of the before period but continue to hold in the after period, one
could just use the latter part of the before period. This is similar to the scenario in a difference-
in-difference model when there is evidence of a diverging trend during an earlier portion of the
pre-intervention period, researchers can restrict the analysis to include only the latter part of the
before period with the hope that parallel trend assumption is more likely to be valid13. However,
the finding of pattern (iii) or (iv) in the before period suggests caution.
Appendix 6: Analysis Using After Period of 2008-2013
For the period of 2008-2013, Missouri’s age-adjusted firearm homicide rate was 5.5, the upper
control group’s age-adjusted firearm homicide rate was 5.0 and the lower control’s age adjusted
firearm homicide rate was 2.9. Using an after period of 2008-2013, difference-in-difference
estimates for the upper and lower control groups are shown in Table 3. Using an after period
of 2008-2013, the interval (10) that has a ≥ 95% chance of containing the effect of the repeal
on the firearm homicide rate is [0.2, 1.4], corresponding to a 5% to 31% increase in firearm
homicides, providing evidence that the repeal increased firearm homicides.
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Table 3: Difference-in-difference estimates of effect of repeal of Missouri’s permit-to-purchase
handgun licensing requirement on firearm homicide rates per 100,000 persons using after period
of 2008-2013
Control Group Estimate 95% CI Corresponding % Change Estimate 95% CI
Upper Controls 1.0 [0.6, 1.4] 22% [14% ,31%]
Lower Controls 0.6 [0.2, 1.0] 17% [5% ,19%]
Appendix 7: Comparison with the Synthetic Control Method
Abadie et al. 25 proposed constructing a synthetic control group which is a linear combination
of multiple control groups that matches the before period outcomes of the treatment group.
The synthetic control method provides asymptotically unbiased estimates of the causal effect
of treatment assuming that the unmeasured confounders can be represented by a factor model
with the factors’ effects in each time period being linear with a time-specific slope, whereas our
bracketing method only provides bounds under this assumption. However, this assumption is
strong and is not generally satisfied in our model (1)-(4). In the following section we provide a
simple example that satisfies the assumptions of our model but for which the estimate returned
by the synthetic control method will be biased.
If the types of interaction between history and group in the after period that are of concern
have occurred in the before period (e.g., a similar recession occurred in the after period as the
before period), then the synthetic control method’s matching of the before period outcomes
might enable it to match the treated group’s counterfactual trajectory in the after period in the
absence of treatment. However, if the types of interaction are different (e.g., there is a more
severe recession in the after period or the interactions between poor health and the macroecon-
omy have been altered by other policy changes), then the synthetic control’s matching in the
before period does not provide much reassurance unless one has a basis for strong functional
form assumptions such as the factors representing the unmeasured confounders’ having a linear
effect in each time period. In contrast, the bracketing method relies on assumptions such as (6)
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that the unmeasured confounders’ effect is increasing (or decreasing) in importance over time
over the whole range of the unmeasured confounders that can be assessed using subject matter
knowledge without making strong functional form assumptions.
Appendix 8: Example of How Synthetic Control Model Assumptions Are
Violated in Our Model
For example, suppose U has an exponential distribution in each group with scale 0.2, 0.5 and
τ in the lower control, upper control and treated groups respectively where 0.2 < τ < 0.5
and h(U, 0) = U , h(U, 1) = exp(U). Then the synthetic control linear combination is τ−0.2
0.3
×
lower control group + 0.5−τ
0.3
× upper control group. For the after period, the linear combination
of the mean outcomes for the synthetic control linear combination is τ−0.2
0.3
× 1.25 + 0.5−τ
0.3
× 2
while the treated group’s counterfactual mean outcome in the absence of treatment is −1/τ−1/τ+1 ,
and τ−0.2
0.3
× 1.25+ 0.5−τ
0.3
× 2 < −1/τ−1/τ+1 for all 0.2 < τ < 0.5. Thus the synthetic control group’s
after period mean is always less than than the counterfactual after period mean for the treatment
group in the absence of treatment.
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